Practice and Procecdure—Rule 16—Grounds for Granting New Trial by Siderius, Raymond H.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 28 
Number 3 Washington Legislation—1953 
8-1-1953 
Practice and Procecdure—Rule 16—Grounds for Granting New 
Trial 
Raymond H. Siderius 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Raymond H. Siderius, Recent Cases, Practice and Procecdure—Rule 16—Grounds for Granting New Trial, 
28 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 241 (1953). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol28/iss3/20 
This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
RECENT CASES
sounds in tort, and therefore the contract defense is inapplicable. A finding of bad faith
may follow from a neglect or refusal to fulfill some contract obligation, Bundy v.
Commercial Credit Co., 202 N.C. 604, 163 S.E. 676 (1932), and an action based
thereon sounds in tort, Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casulty Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A.
788 (1936). The court does not state what contract obligation was unfulfilled. There
is no- contractual obligation of the insurer to settle or compromise suits against
the insured. The court must have been referring to the implied obligation of the in-
surer to use good faith because of a fiduciary relationship arising from the insured's
having surrendered all right to defend suits or effect compromises. Amerscan Fidelity
and Casualty Co. v. .l,4 American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7 (C.A. 10th 1949).
It is unfortunate that the trial court never determined whether the loss was within
the policy coverage. Similar litigation might be avoided by several courses of action.
(1) Force the insurer to elect to defend unconditionally or surrender the defense to the
insured. Then if the damage suit reveals loss within the policy coverage, the insured
may recover from the insurer in a separate suit if necessary, although payment by
the insurer would be almost certain in view of the evidence indicating that the loss
was within the policy coverage; (2) Allow counsel of the insurer and the insured to
participate in the defense, thus giving protection to the interests of both. This is the
method suggested by the Fidelity and Conpton cases, supra; (3) Either of the forego-
ing solutions could be carried out by a provision in our Insurance Code directing the
course of action to be pursued when similar "conflicts of interest" arise.
MYRON J. CARLSON
Practice and Procedure-Rule 16--Grounds for Granting New Trial. P sued D for
malpractice. After a verdict for P, the trial court granted D's motion for new trial,
citing Rule 16, sub. 9 of the General Rules of the Superior Court, 34A Wn2d 117,
i.e., "substantial justice has not been done." The court listed in the order granting the
new trial the following reasons: insufficient evidence of negligence, prejudice of a
juror, statements of P's counsel tending to prejudice the. jury against D, speed of the
verdict, consideration of the entire record and proceedings, and appearance and de-
meanor of witnesses. P appealed. Held: reversed and judgment for P according to-the
verdict. Rule 16 requires that in all cases where a trial court grants a motion for new
trial it shall in the order of granting the motion give definite reasons of law and facts
for so doing. The roasons based on the record are insufficient to warrant a new trial and
the reasons based upon the trial court's consideration of the proceedings and demeanor
of witnesses do not show in what way D was prejudiced thereby. Mulka v. Keyes, 41
Wn. 2d 427, 249 P2d 972 (1952).
The Supreme Court for many years has been committed to the proposition that the
trial court may in its discretion, grant a new trial on the ground that substantial jus-
tice has not been done. See Green, Procedural Progress in Washington, 26 WAsH L
Rav. 87, 109 (1951). The requirement that the trial court list reasons for such a con-
clusion was added to the Rules in 1951, as a result of a discussion in Coppo v. Van
Wetringen, 36 Wn2d 120, 217 P.2d 294 (1950). In the Coppo case, Justice Hill indi-
cated that the Supreme Court would be able to perform the appellate function more
effectively if the trial court were required to state reasons of law and fact for the
granting of the new trial order.
Washington, in allowing an appeal from an order granting a new trial is in a mi-
nority position. Most jurisdictions deny such appeal upon the ground of lack of finality
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or trial court discretion, and such was the rule at common law. See Hayes v. Sear
Roebuck & Co., 34 Wn. 2d 666, 673, 209 P.2d 468, 472 (1949).
The instant case indicates that the trial court's assertion that the order is based
upon matters outside the record is not a sufficient reason under Rule 16, and even a
reference to the demeanor of witnesses, though admittedly not a consideration based
on the record is, in itself, too general.
That the result of the instant case is proper cannot be questioned, since as the opin-
ion points out, no particular significance was attached to the demeanor of any wit-
ness at the time the testimony was taken, and so the reasons in the trial court de-
cision which were not a part of the record seemed to come as an afterthought. How-
ever, a requirement that the trial judge specify with particularity the prejudicial effect
of such factors that are outside the record would seem to be an unreasonable encroach-
ment upon the sound discretion of the trial court.
RAYmoND H. Smmauus
Domestic Relations-Natural Guardianship in Grandparents. The superior court of
Washington for King County deprived the parents of X, a minor, of any and all par-
ental rights in or to the child and directed that he be a ward of the court. Y, the
maternal grandmother, petitioned for custody of the child. After complete and extend-
ed inquiry into Y's ability to care for the child the superior court (called the juvenile
court in this type of proceeding), denied the request for custody due primarily to Y's
tubercular condition. Held Reversed and remanded. When the parents were per-
manently deprived of custody the grandmother became the natural guardian and was
entitled to custody if she were found to be a proper person. The majority opinion
expressly states that the record presented supports the finding that the grandmother
was unfit. The case, however, is remanded for further proceedings because Y's claim
that the court below did not regard her as having a "preference right" to the child by
virtue of her natural guardianship and also due to her assertion that she would be
able to submit evidence of an improved physical condition. Four judges dissented.
State ex rel. Michelson v. Superior Court, 41 Wn.2d 718, 251 P.2d 603 (1952).
This case introduces into Washington the concept of natural guardianship passing
from the parents, upon death or permanent deprivation of their parental rights, to the
grandparents. The court declares that this is its first occasion to pass upon the legal
status of a blood relative of a child whose parents have either died or been per-
manently deprived of custody. It is true that this is the first case in Washington where-
in the court has had to deal directly with this contention. There are cases, which the
court in the instant case distinguished, in which language used suggested that grand-
parents have no legal right to custody of any child prior to an award of custody
to them by the court. See Morin v. Morin, 66 Wash. 312. 119 pac. 745 (1911) and In
re Stuart, 138 Wash.59, 244 Pac. 116 (1926).
The code provisions governing dependent and delinquent children and juvenile courts
would appear to be an obstacle to the result reached here. RCW 13.04 [RRS §1987]
governs juvenile courts and the awarding of custody of a "dependent child" as defined
(in the subsections pertinent here) by RCW 13.04.010 (5), (6), and (8) [RRS
§1987-1]. The code makes no mention of any rights residing in anyone to the custody
of a dependent child and seems to indicate that the juvenile court has discretion to
award custody of a dependent child to the person or institution it considers to be most
desireable for the welfare of the child. The Supreme Court agrees that the child in
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